Wikileaks US Military Signals & Diplomatic Traffic Security

Has the experience of the alleged leaks by Mr Assange's 'Wikileaks' websight got anything to teach us, Brits about our military signals security and diplomatic traffic being breached by alleged hackers?

It seems incredible that all these alleged 'leaks' go back to one lowly Private, called Bradley Manning. It makes one wonder just how signals security was so lax to allow one person had access to all this traffic, and be able to siphon it off on portable computer media (DVDS, floppies or memory sticks). Does this say something about the negligence of US Military and Diplomatic staff as to password security? (some folks are even known to sue the word 'password' as their password!!).

I know in the 1960s and 1970s security was paramount as to who had access, and who could gained sight of different levels of classified documents (Code Word et al), and off and on-line cypher equipment..

Is our UK signals security much tighter than that of our US allies, and have any lessons been learned in respect to regular changing of password. The storming of the US Embassy in Tehran in 1979. The destruction of cypher equipment, open time pads, documentation was allegedly not carried out properly, or that there was not enough time to do this. The Iranian Intelligence successfully managed to reconstruct US diplomatic and other traffic that had been shredded, but not cross-cut shredded.

Could another 'Wikileaks' ever occur in the States, or have lessons been learned?

Way back in 1954 I was temp attached to the Australian Signals in Kure, Japan.
One morning I'm detailed to supervise the burning of the 'top secret' waste .... off I trots to the camp boiler room where I find one of the many Japanese employed around the camp happily stuffing the aforesaid 'top secret' waste into the boiler, it included the daily codewords, plain text messages broken into groups prior to encryption, decrypted messages, miles of perforated tape from the Rockex, and all kinds of other papers and docs up to secret.
I just about sh*t myself .. but the Aussie Cipher Officer said don't sweat it corporal he does it every week, just sign the report and hand it to the Sqn clerk. I respectfully declined to sign any bloody report and gave it back to him.
Was never asked to supervise the burning again.

Len (Ciphers)

The raid on the US Legation and murder of the Ambassador in Bhengazi a few weeks ago must have given the Americans nightmares. It has been alleged that this was a deliberately planned and targeted operation by militants and Al-Queda supporters. So who could have been behind this, and did they get what they came for - US diplomatic and military documents, Laptops, sigint material and cipher keys and equipment just like in the 1979 Iranian invasion of the US Embassy in Tehran.

So who gains by this, Tehran and its military intelligence community? Who else could be in the bidding to have a dekko at any materiel that was taken (alleged) - the FSB or the Chinese Intelligence community?

In the 1970s, any destruction of confidential material (documents etc) was closely supervised with 2 people. One as escort, and the other as witness that the burn in the incinerator had been successful, and all ashes were raked out, checked that it had burned properly and disposed of as per SOPS.

No doubt there will be further attempts at US and Western Legations, Embassy and other buildings to see if they can be broken into.

Glad I was a Gun Bunny!!